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1. INTRODUCTION
The dynamic economic and technical environment surrounding modern day
business operations requires today’s enterprises to strive evermore to stay
competitive in the marketplace [Kern 2002]. The fast paced advancements in
information technology infrastructure has placed growing demands on the en-
terprise to rise above the competition by making its operations more expand-
able,responsivetoexternalfactors,and,ontopofall,secure.Thishasmotivated
many enterprises to adopt enterprise computing (EC) services for efﬁcient re-
sourceutilization,scalabilityandﬂexibility[JavaCommerce].Suchenterprises
are also known as computer-integrated enterprise (CIE). The CIE is character-
ized by heterogeneous, distributed computing systems exchanging enormous
volumes of time-critical data, with varying levels of access control, through the
use of EC technology. The EC framework highlights the durability and main-
tainability of the enterprise assets, and emphasizes upon the scalability and
ﬂexibility of system infrastructure to allow it to evolve with time. While adopt-
ing such strategies is vital to the success of enterprise’s business operations, it
poses some serious challenges in terms of ensuring an enterprise-wide secure
interoperation among the various collaborating entities.
These challenges belong to various domains within the CIE, and each needs
to be addressed in order to achieve the overall enterprise goals. The access
control policy of a large enterprise has many elements and many points of en-
forcement [XML coverpages 2003a]. Elements of policy may be managed by
the information systems department, human resources, the legal department,
and the ﬁnance department. And the policy may be enforced by the extranet,
mail,WAN,andremote-accesssystems.Asmostenterprisesaremigratingfrom
legacy systems to newer infrastructure, the uniformity among the communica-
tion protocols across the heterogeneous systems is essential to interoperability,
and hence timely and accurate execution of enterprise-level policies. Another
concern faced by large enterprise applications is the number of users or clients
accessing the enterprise resources, which runs in tens of thousands. Since these
resources would typically have privilege levels associated with them, a mecha-
nismneedstobeprovidedtoallowonlyauthorizeduserstoaccesstherequested
resource. Hence, exercising content-based access control is a signiﬁcant chal-
lenge in securing large enterprises. Yet another dimension that complicates
access control speciﬁcation is the dynamic nature of context-based conditions
attached with access decisions. An enterprise may grant/revoke access to re-
sources to certain individuals based on their level of involvement in the current
stage of product life cycle. The access constraints are also extended to sharing
of information between various users based on their degree of relevance to re-
sources at a particular time. To adequately satisfy these kinds of conditions in
a dynamic environment, hence, constitutes another signiﬁcant challenge. Our
primary goal in this paper is to investigate these challenges and propose an
XML-based access control speciﬁcation language and enforcement mechanism
that adequately addresses them.
Our speciﬁcation language is based on generalized temporal role based ac-
cess control (GTRBAC) model [Joshi et al. 2005]. GTRBAC is a generalized
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temporal extension of the widely accepted role based access control (RBAC)
model proposed in the NIST RBAC standard [Ferraiolo et al. 2001]. RBAC
model, because of its generality, can be used for deﬁning a diverse set of access
control policies. Another advantage of the RBAC model is that it simpliﬁes au-
thorization administration in large enterprises. RBAC models have also been
shown to be policy-neutral [Sandhu et al. 1996], and can be used to represent
a variety of security policies, including both DAC and MAC policies [Osborn
et al. 2000]. Although several approaches have been presented in the literature
based on RBAC to address various aspects of security administration within
an enterprise, they have their own drawbacks that render them unsuitable for
enterprise-wide access control (see Section 8). GTRBAC extends RBAC to al-
low a generalized mechanism to express a diverse set of ﬁne-grained temporal
constraints on user-role and permission-role assignments in order to meet the
dynamic content-based context-aware access control requirements of an enter-
prise. Our framework augments the GTRBAC model with XML to allow for sup-
porting the policy enforcement in a heterogeneous, distributed environment.
Notable extensions with respect to GTRBAC include the support for creden-
tials, which is essential when dealing with heterogeneity (see Section 3.2), and
a comprehensive architectural framework, based on the use of modular policy
documents, covering all modeling components of a typical RBAC model. More-
over, our framework is based on XML schemas, and not DTDs, and hence has
more expressive power and support for data types as compared to DTD-based
approaches [IBM].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst provide an
introduction to the basic concepts related to XML and GTRBAC, since their
understanding is deemed essential for having a good grasp on the concepts out-
lined in the paper. The discussion on RBAC and its extensions is also included
in this section as part of introducing GTRBAC. We next provide the motiva-
tion behind the X-GTRBAC framework, and discuss the achievable goals of our
system in context of enterprise security. The next section outlines the formal
speciﬁcationsoftheGTRBACmodel.ThedetailedX-GTRBACspeciﬁcationlan-
guage is then presented. The implementation architecture and system design
is discussed next. A comprehensive example of a generic CIE is then presented
to illustrate the applicability of the X-GTRBAC framework. The example not
only serves to fortify the discussion on the model, but also brings together the
various concepts explained throughout the paper. We then discuss our imple-
mentation experiences to highlight signiﬁcant features of our framework. The
paper concludes with a compendium of related work, and discussion on some
future research goals.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 XML
The eXtensible Markup language (XML) [XML 2000] evolved from a simple
subset of SGML [ISO 1986], and is now hailed as the most promising tech-
nology for information interchange across heterogeneous, distributed domains
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Fig. 1. (a) An XML instance document and (b) its schema.
[Web Reference]. XML is a metalanguage that lets users design their own
markup language, and hence allows them to deﬁne an agreed-upon vocabu-
lary for application-speciﬁc tasks. XML achieves this by offering an extensible
setofmarkuptagstocreatecustomdocuments,andasetofrelatedtechnologies
for their interpretation.
Each XML document has both a logical and a physical structure
[Java Commerce]. Physically, the document is composed of units called enti-
ties. An entity may refer to other entities to include them in the document. A
document begins in a “root” or document entity. Logically, the document is com-
posed of declarations, elements, comments, character references, and process-
ing instructions, all of which are indicated in the document by explicit markup.
Additionally, elements may contain attributes as well.
The structure of the XML document is expressed through an XML schema
[W3]. A schema itself is an XML document that deﬁnes the valid syntax of
an XML instance document, where the term instance document denotes a doc-
ument conforming to the said schema. Figure 1 illustrates an XML instance
document and its corresponding schema. Here, the structure of the various
XML tags in the instance document is governed by the schema deﬁnition. For
instance, the second line in the schema deﬁnition declares “enterprise” as the
root element of the document. The “depts” element is then added to the root
as a child element. The hierarchy is similarly extended to incorporate all the
desired elements. This extensible naming mechanism hence allows the creation
of customized documents that capture the application-speciﬁc needs of any en-
terprise. For interested readers, the detailed speciﬁcations of XML and XML
schemas can be found at XML [2000] and [W3].
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2.2 RBAC and Its Extensions
As stated in the Introduction, the GTRBAC model is a generalized temporal
extension of the RBAC model. We now provide a brief introduction to the RBAC
model and its temporal and generalized temporal extensions.
2.2.1 RBAC Model. The RBAC model as proposed in the NIST RBAC stan-
dard consists of the following four basic components: a set of users Users,aset
of roles Roles,aset of permissions Permissions, and a set of sessions Sessions.
A user is a human being or an autonomous agent. A role is a collection of
permissions needed to perform a certain job function within an organization. A
permission is an access mode that can be exercised on objects in the system, and
a session relates a user to possibly many roles. When a user logs in the system,
he/sheestablishesasessionand,duringthesessioncanrequesttoactivatesome
subset of roles he/she is authorized to assume. An activation request is granted
only if the corresponding role is enabled at the time of the request and the user
is entitled to activate the role at that time. If the activation request is satisﬁed,
the user issuing the request obtains all the permissions associated with the
role he/she has requested to activate. On the sets Users, Roles, Permissions,
and Sessions, several relations are deﬁned. The user-to-role assignment (UA)
and the permission-to-role assignment (PA) relations model the assignment of
users to roles and the assignment of permissions to roles respectively. A user
can be a member of many roles and a role can have many members. Moreover,
a role can have many permissions and the same permissions can be associated
with many roles. The user function maps each session to a single user, whereas
function role establishes a mapping between a session and a set of roles (that
is, the roles which are activated by the corresponding user in the session). On
Roles,ahierarchy is deﬁned, denoted by ≥.I fri ≥ rj,r i,r j ∈ Roles, then ri
inherits the permissions of rj.I nsuch a case, ri is a senior role and rj a junior
role. The following deﬁnition formalizes the above discussion.
Deﬁnition 2.2.1 (RBAC Model [Ferraiolo et al. 2001]). The RBAC model
consists of the following components:
 Sets Users, Roles, Permissions, and Sessions representing the set of users,
roles, permissions, and sessions, respectively;
 PA: Roles → Permissions, the permission assignment relation that assigns
permissions to roles;
 UA: Users → Roles, the user assignment relation that assigns users to roles;
 user: Sessions → Users, which maps each session to a single user;
 role: Sessions → 2Roles that maps each session to a set of roles;
 RH ⊆ Roles × Roles,apartially ordered role hierarchy (written ≥).
The RBAC model differentiates itself from traditional access control mod-
els in that the permissions in RBAC are not directly associated with users,
but with roles. Roles are created by the security administrators to reﬂect the
various functional categories of users within the enterprise. Users are then as-
signed membership to roles, and these roles are in turn assigned permissions.
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Fig. 2. Core RBAC elements and their relation (source: NIST RBAC standard [Ferraiolo et al.
2001]).
Permissions are actually composed of an object-to-operations mapping. The el-
ement relationships of Core RBAC model are illustrated in Figure 2.
RBAC approach naturally ﬁts into an organizational context as users are as-
signed to organizational roles that have well-deﬁned responsibilities and privi-
leges. The RBAC model proposed by NIST, because of its generality, can be used
to express a very wide range of security policies including discretionary and
mandatory, as well as user-deﬁned organizational speciﬁc policies [Ferraiolo
et al. 1993, 2000; Osborn et al. 2000; Sandhu et al. 1996]. Many beneﬁts of an
RBAC approach include its support for security management and the principle
of least privilege [Sandhu et al. 1996]. For example, we can easily manage a
change in a user’s responsibility or role within the organization by assigning
him/her the new role and removing him/her from the old one. Furthermore,
use of role hierarchies and grouping of objects into object classes based on re-
sponsibility associated with a role makes the management of permissions very
easy. By conﬁguring the assignment of the least set of privileges from a role set
assigned to a user when he/she activates the role, inadvertent damage can be
minimized in a system.
2.2.2 Temporal Extensions to RBAC. Because of its relevance and above-
mentioned beneﬁts that it provides, the RBAC model has been widely investi-
gated and several extensions to it have been proposed. A set of such extensions
related to the temporal dimension of the model shall now be discussed. An
initial temporal extension to RBAC has been proposed in the temporal RBAC
(TRBAC)model[Bertinoetal.2001].Thishasbeenmotivatedbythefactthatin
many organizations, functions may have limited or periodic temporal duration.
Consider, for instance, the case of a component technician in a manufacturing
enterpriseandassumethatanytechnicianistobeauthorizedtoworkonlywhen
a supervisor is at work. If both the technician and supervisor are represented
as roles, enforcing such a requirement entails constraining the enabling of a
technician role only during the speciﬁed temporal interval when the supervisor
roleisenabled.TRBACallowsthespeciﬁcationofsuchtemporalconditions.The
main features it provides include the periodic enabling/disabling of roles and
temporal dependencies among them expressed by means of role triggers, which
are active rules that are automatically executed based on the enabling and/
or disabling of roles. Priorities are associated with both triggers and periodic
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enabling/disabling of roles to handle possible conﬂicts that can arise, when the
simultaneous enabling/disabling of a role is required. In such cases, a com-
bination of priority and disabling-take-precedence rule is used to resolve the
conﬂicts. TRBAC further allows an administrator to issue run-time requests
for enabling and disabling a role and restricted handling of role activations by
a user. TRBAC, however, is inadequate to express a variety of useful tempo-
ral constraints. In particular, TRBAC does not include temporal constraints on
(i) user-to-role and permission-to-role assignments, and (ii) activations of roles
by users. In (i), TRBAC assumes that only roles can be transient, that is, only
they are enabled and disabled at different time intervals. In this paper, we
motivate the point that in a typical enterprise environment, roles, as well as
users and permissions assigned to them, may also be transient. Because of (ii),
TRBAC does not use a well-deﬁned, separate notion of role enabling and role
activation, and hence cannot enforce a ﬁne-grained access control at the user
level for role activation. The GTRBAC model distinguishes between the notions
of role activation from that of role enabling to incorporate various activation
constraints on role activations at the individual user level. It also extends the
temporal constraint enforcement mechanism to user-to-role and permission-
to-role assignments. It thus allows the speciﬁcation of a more complete set of
temporal constraints related not only to role enabling, but also to user-to-role
assignment, permission-to-role assignment, and role activation. The notions of
triggers and safety, as provided in TRBAC, are also accordingly extended to
capture the enhanced language semantics. The X-GTRBAC framework hence
builds upon the elaborate and consistent set of speciﬁcations laid out in the
GTRBAC model.
3. MOTIVATION AND GOALS
We now present a motivation for adopting XML and GTRBAC for our
X-GTRBAC policy speciﬁcation framework, and highlight the achievable goals
in the light of its application to enterprise-wide access control.
3.1 Motivation for XML
The use of XML is primarily motivated by the vast heterogeneity of collabo-
rating entities exhibited by the distributed enterprise environment. The vari-
ous functional units within an enterprise, connected through multiple media,
and each comprising several computing systems ranging from old to new, are
linked together by the EC technology. Hence the need arises for an interopera-
ble mechanism to efﬁciently express and enforce the enterprise access control
policy. XML provides a uniform, vendor-neutral representation of enterprise
data, and allows a mechanism for interchange, sharing and dissemination of
information content across heterogeneous systems. XML is, therefore, a natu-
ral choice as the basis for the enterprise policy speciﬁcation language, due to
the ease with which its syntax and semantics can be extended to accommodate
the unique requirements of an enterprise, and the widespread support that it
enjoys from all the main platform and tool vendors [XML Coverpages 2003a]
which promotes interoperability.
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The motivation for XML actually goes beyond the fact that it enjoys
widespread support and is being used as the de facto communication standard
in distributed environments. The interoperability advantage that XML pro-
vides has great consequences in the contemporary security arena. There are
today a large number of evolving standards and most prominent amongst them
are those designed for Web-based security (including authentication and access
control). The design of Web-based security mechanisms is a major shift from
the design of classical protocols since it faces the arduous task of securing in-
herently dynamic Web-based resources in open Internet environment, with the
additional requirement that resources be accessible through very basic mecha-
nisms and tools (such as Web browser). The support for interoperability in XML
has therefore led to a signiﬁcant interest in using XML for designing such pro-
tocols, since it would enable the deployment of interoperable, lightweight (i.e.,
browser based) security mechanisms in open environments. This present at-
tempt at augmenting GTRBAC with XML is motivated by the emerging trend
of migration of enterprise operations on the Internet, which necessitates so-
phisticated Web-based access control mechanisms. We discuss additional mo-
tivations for adopting XML in conjunction with GTRBAC at the end of next
subsection.
3.2 Motivation for GTRBAC
The discussion on the challenges in Introduction would now be presented in
greater detail. The motivation behind adopting the GTRBAC model for enforc-
ing enterprise-wide access control is to incorporate within the access control
model the following set of capabilities:
3.2.1 Content-Based Context-Aware Access. Information access within an
enterprise may need to be restricted based on the information content and
the contextual information obtained at the time the access requests are made.
For example, an external client may not be allowed to access the product design
manualfromtheenterprisedocumentrepository.Oritmaybethecasethatonly
the authorized component technicians are allowed to access the plant inven-
tory for a manufacturing enterprise, and such access would be restricted to the
components related to the technician’s job function. Hence the need arises to ex-
ercise content-based access control for all users accessing enterprise resources.
The access control model should also capture security-relevant environmental
context and incorporate it in its access control decisions. Access requests may
be decided based on several context parameters, such as time or location. An
example of location parameter is user domains, which are classiﬁed by IP ad-
dresses. In the manufacturing enterprise, the access control model could allow
all users who submit an access request from within the design department In-
tranet to access the product design manual at any time for easy reference. This
access may, however, be limited to be read-only for certain less privileged users.
The time parameter needs to be incorporated in the model to express the time-
dependent access constraints within an enterprise. For instance, in addition to
the restriction that a particular component technician should be granted access
to only the relevant components of the product, it is quite likely that such access
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is further restricted to only the times when the product is in the manufacturing
stage. Another view of time-dependent constraints captures the periodic nature
and associated duration of enterprise tasks. One example for such constraint
could be a rule that the vendor contracts may only be allowed to be accessed
by vendors in the second week of every quarter of every year, and need to be
submitted within two weeks of that time. More complicated context conditions
allow for expressing even more sophisticated constraints. As an example, it
may be required for the manufacturing enterprise that the product engineering
work should only start after the product design work has been completed. This
requires for checking various context parameters to evaluate the stated condi-
tion,andallowfortherequestedorscheduledtasktobeexecuted.Amechanism
for the resolution of these challenges based on a combination of the temporal
framework of the GTRBAC model and the attribute-based constraint speciﬁca-
tion of X-GTRBAC shall be discussed in the paper, and illustrated through a
comprehensive CIE example in Section 7.
3.2.2 Heterogeneity of Subjects and Objects. In a CIE, heterogeneity im-
plies the diversity of users and resources across the component systems mak-
ing up the enterprise. Object heterogeneity may exist in the form of different
types of enterprise resources that need to be protected. These can range from
purchase and marketing contracts, to design and engineering manuals, to vari-
ous product assemblies and components. Furthermore, the information content
therein can evolve with time as new resources are added and old ones removed
or updated, introducing scalability problems in privilege management. Subject
heterogeneity implies that users have diverse activity proﬁles, characteristics,
and/or qualiﬁcations that may not be known a priori. Such activity proﬁle is
needed by the EC technology to dynamically confer privileges to authenticated
users by upgrading their current role. This is needed because the trust level
of the user may be elevated, as the product goes through the various stages
within the enterprise, and access to more privileged resources may accordingly
be allowed. For instance, a product technician with sufﬁcient experience may
be elevated to the role of product supervisor, and allowed to access the product
assemblies component at the time of manufacturing of the product assembly.
Subject heterogeneity complicates access control speciﬁcation. The GTRBAC
model uses the abstraction of roles to manage a large number of user and re-
source pools, which tackles the scalability aspect but not the diversity aspect of
the subject heterogeneity problem. The issue there is that user identity cannot
be assumed for role assignment, since the assignment conditions might depend
on transient/dynamic properties of a user. We resolve this issue by using the
notion of “credentials” in X-GTRBAC, as discussed in Section 5.1. Following
a credential-based role assignment, the GTRBAC constraint mechanism can
then be applied for privilege management. Object heterogeneity can similarly
be addressed by associating relevant content-based constraints with resources.
The preceding discussion provides the motivation for using XML and
GTRBAC toward the design of an access control scheme for a distributed en-
terprise environment. XML addresses the issues of interoperability between
various protocols and across multiple enterprise units. GTRBAC addresses the
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content-based context-aware access control requirements and the subject and
object heterogeneity challenges within a CIE. The need arises therefore to com-
bine the features from these two models in an integrated framework that can
be employed for meeting the aforementioned challenges of enterprise-wide ac-
cess control. The use of XML in security protocols is not new. The area of XML
security has gained signiﬁcant momentum in the last few years, with stan-
dardssuchasSecurityAssertionsMarkupLanguage(SAML)[XMLCoverpages
2003b] and XML-based Access Control Language (XACML) [XML Coverpages
2003a] recently been adopted. However, the unique requirements highlighted
in the paper have not been addressed by any existing speciﬁcation (see Section
8). We believe that our XML-based framework can contribute to the XML se-
curity research by providing an access control mechanism that not only meets
these requirements, but is also interoperable with existing XML security stan-
dards. In fact, the authors have used this framework to propose an approach
that integrates SAML with RBAC [Bhatti et al. 2004a]. Our work has been
included in a recent announcement by the OASIS industrial consortium that
hailed the emergence of Web-based speciﬁcations for RBAC security standard
[XML Coverpages 2004]. Toward further advancement of such efforts, the X-
GTRBAC framework presented in this paper outlines an XML-based speciﬁca-
tion language that focuses on encapsulating all the basic features set forth in
the GTRBAC model. We next outline the formal speciﬁcations of the GTRBAC
model, and in the subsequent section introduce the speciﬁcation language for
our X-GTRBAC framework.
4. GTRBAC MODEL
The GTRBAC model allows the speciﬁcation of an elaborate set of temporal
constraints on role enabling/disabling, activation/deactivation, and user-to-role
and permission-to-role assignment/de-assignment. These constraints are com-
posed of periodic-time expressions that capture the valid periods of time when
the corresponding constraint may be satisﬁed. This expression has three parts:
(i) a start-time expression, indicating a valid start time, (ii) an interval ex-
pression, indicating the interval within which the constraint may be satisﬁed,
and (iii) a duration expression, indicating the valid duration for the constraint.
Note that all parts of the periodic-time expression are optional, and the ab-
sence of any one of them means that there is no corresponding time restriction.
The model additionally allows trigger-based temporal conditions to be speci-
ﬁed. These conditions are captured through status expressions for roles and
assignments.
Speciﬁcally, the following temporal constraints and events are allowed in
GTRBAC:
1. Temporal constraints on
(a) Role enabling: These constraints allow the speciﬁcation of the valid time
periods during which a role is enabled/disabled. Additional content and
context conditions may also be supplied within the constraint.
(b) Role activation: These constraints allow the speciﬁcation of the valid
time periods during which a role is activated/deactivated. Additional
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content and context conditions may also be supplied within the con-
straint. Role activation only occurs as a run-time event.
(c) User-to-role assignment: These constraints allow the speciﬁcation of the
valid time periods during which a user may be assigned to a role. Ad-
ditional content and context conditions may also be supplied within the
constraint.
(d) Permission-to-role assignment: These constraints allow the speciﬁcation
of the valid time periods during which a permission may be assigned to
a role. Additional content and context conditions may also be supplied
within the constraint.
2. Run-timeevents:Asetofrun-timeeventsallowsauseroranadministratorto
dynamically initiate actions. One such example captured in our framework
is activation/deactivation of a role. Note that activation requests for a role
may only be supplied by the user, since role activation is done at the user’s
discretion.
3. Triggers: Triggers allow for expressing dependency among GTRBAC events,
as well as capturing the past events and deﬁning future events based on
them. Triggers may not include any activation event in their head, for the
reason cited above.
In addition to the above temporal constraints, the GTRBAC model sup-
ports the following separation of duty constraints as per the NIST RBAC
standard:
(a) Static separation of duty: The semantics of static separation of duty
require that no n roles that are part of a “static separation of duty role
set” (SSD Role Set) be assigned to the same user, where n is any positive
integer.
(b) Dynamic separation of duty: The semantics of dynamic separation of
dutyrequirethatnomrolesthatarepartofa“dynamicseparationofduty
role set” (DSD Role Set) be simultaneously active in the same session of
the same user, where m is any positive integer.
We reproduce below, for completeness, the formal expressions for the speci-
ﬁcation of periodic time and the temporal constraints and events in GTRBAC.
Deﬁnition 4.2.1 (Periodic Expression [Bertino et al. 1998]). Given calen-
dars Cd, Ci, ..., Cn, and time occurrences O1, ..., On,aperiodic expression P
is deﬁned as
P =
n  
i=1
Oi.Ci  x.Cd
where O1 = all, Oi ∈ 2N∪{all}, Ci   Ci−1 for i = 2, .., n, Cd = Cn, and x ∈ N.
Periodic-Time Expression:P eriodic time is represented by pairs <[begin, end],
P>, where P is a periodic expression denoting an inﬁnite set of periodic time
instants, and [begin, end]i satime interval I denoting the lower and upper
bounds that are imposed on instants in P.
The formalism for periodic expressions is based on the one used in Niezette
andStevenne[1992],andreliesonthenotionofcalendars.Acalendarisdeﬁned
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as a countable set of contiguous intervals,1 numbered by integers called indexes
of the intervals. In our discussion, we assume the existence of a set of calendars
containing the calendars days, weeks, months, and years, where days is the
calendar with the ﬁnest granularity, that is, it is the basic calendar.
Symbol  separates the ﬁrst part of the periodic expression that identiﬁes
the set of starting points of the intervals it represents, from the speciﬁcation of
thedurationDofeachintervalintermsofcalendarCd.F orexample,all.Years+
{3, 7}.Months  2.Months represents the set of intervals starting at the same
instant as the third and seventh month of every year, and having a duration
of 2 months. In practice, Oi is omitted when its value is all, whereas it is
represented by its unique element when it is a singleton. x.Cd is omitted when
it is equal to 1.Cn.
Event expression:Asimple event expression has one of the following forms:
(a) enable r or disable r, where r ∈ Roles.
(b) assign r to u or de-assign r to u, where r ∈ Roles and u ∈ Users.
(c) assign ptor or de-assign pto r, where p ∈ Permissions andr ∈ Roles.
Role status expression: Role status expressions have one of the following forms:
(a) enabled r or ¬ enabled r (or disabled r), where r ∈ Roles.
(b) activated r, where r ∈ Roles.
(c) active r for u or ¬ active r for u, where r ∈ Roles and u ∈ Users.
Assignment status expression: Assignment status expressions have the follow-
ing forms:
(a) assigned r to u or ¬ assigned r to u, where r ∈ Roles andu ∈ Users.
(b) assigned p to r or ¬ assigned p to r, where r ∈ Roles and p ∈
Permissions.
Run-time request: A run-time request expression has one of the following forms:
(a) a user’s run-time request expression to activate a role has the form:
s: activate r for u after  t,or
s: deactivate r for u after  t
where r ∈ Roles,u ∈ Users, s is the session attached to the request, and
 t is the duration.
(b) an administrator’s run-time request expression has the form:
E after  t
where E is an event expression and  t is the duration expression.
Triggers:Atrigger expression has the form
Ei, ..., En, Ci, ..., Ck → E after  t
where Eis are event expressions or run-time requests, Cis are role status
expressions or assignment status expressions, E is an event expression such
that E / ∈{ s:activate r for u}, and  t is a duration expression.
Table I summarizes the temporal constraint types and expressions of the
GTRBAC model. The GTRBAC model extends the safety notion of the TRBAC
1Two intervals are contiguous if they can be collapsed into a single one (e.g., [1, 2] and [3, 4]).
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Table I. Temporal Constraints and Event Expressions in GTRBAC
Constraint
Categories Events Expression
Enabling Role enabling (I, P,D, enable/disable r)
Activation Role activation <!--only occurs as a run-time event -->
Assignment User-to-role assignment ([I, P, D], assignU/deassignU r to u)
Constraint Permission-to-role assignment ([I, P, D], assignP/deassignP p to r)
Trigger <!--any triggering event --> E1 , ..., En, C1, ...,Ck → E after  t
Run-time Users’ activation request (s:(de)activate r for u after  t))
Requests
Administrator’s run-time request
(assignU/de-assignU r to u after  t)
(enable/disable r after  t)
(assignP/de-assignP p to r after  t)
(enable/disable c after  t)
model to show that there exists an execution model for it. Hence the consistency
of our framework is implied by the consistency of GTRBAC model.
5. X-GTRBAC SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE
We now present the speciﬁcation language for our X-GTBRAC framework. The
speciﬁcationisdesignedtoservedualgoals.One,itattemptstomodeltheRBAC
elements and incorporate the functional speciﬁcations as per the NIST RBAC
standard [Ferraiolo et al. 2001]. Secondly, it provides the syntactic and seman-
tic constructs needed to enforce the temporal constraints as per the GTRBAC
model, and in addition also provides an attribute-based credential and con-
straint speciﬁcation framework to address the access control challenges out-
lined in Section 3.2.
5.1 Modeling RBAC Elements
Initial goal of the X-GTRBAC speciﬁcation language is to model the ﬁve ba-
sic RBAC elements (as shown in Figure 2) and their associated set-relations.
To represent the RBAC elements in XML, we generate schema deﬁnitions for
“user,” “role,” and “permission.” Note that schema deﬁnition is not necessary for
“operation” and “object” elements because they are included in a “permission”
deﬁnition as per the RBAC standard, and hence their relationship with other
RBAC elements is captured in the “permission” schema. We introduce a BNF-
like grammar, called X-Grammar, to present an overview of the speciﬁcation
language for the RBAC elements in an XML-syntax.
X-Grammar: The X-Grammar follows the same notion of terminals and nonter-
minals as in BNF, but supports the tagging notation of XML that also allows
expressing attributes within element tags. The use of attributes helps main-
tain compatibility with XML schema syntax, which serves as the type deﬁni-
tion model for our language. Since it follows BNF convention, X-Grammar can
be accepted by a well-deﬁned automaton to allow automatic translation into
XML schema documents. This allows automatic creation of strongly typed pol-
icy schemas based on the supplied grammar speciﬁcation. We choose to use
X-Grammar syntax instead of directly working with XML schemas for ease of
analysis (since existing compiler tools for BNF grammars can be applied) and
better readability and presentation.
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Fig. 3. X-Grammar for XCredTypeDef sheet.
Fig. 4. X-Grammar for XUS.
The non-terminals in X-Grammar are expressed as <!–“non terminal
name”> XML tags, and terminals as standard XML tags. Optional tags are
placed within square brackets “[ ]”. Group portions of a production are included
in curly brackets “{},” with the repeat count indicated by a subscript. The de-
fault count is one. A “∗”a n da“ +” indicates a count of “zero or more,” and “one or
more,” respectively, whereas a “−”i sused to provide a range. A “|” indicates al-
ternateswithinaproductionset,andexactlyonecanbechosen.Anydataplaced
in parenthesis “( )” is not part of the terminal symbol, and shall be supplied by
thesecurityadministrator.TheX-Grammarhasbeenadoptedforaclearexpres-
sionofthespeciﬁcationlanguageconstructs.Thecorrespondingschemasforthe
XML sheets listed in the paper are provided in Appendix A in Bhatti [2003].
5.1.1 Users and Credentials. To evaluate the users being assigned to a
particular role, the speciﬁcation language uses the notion of credentials as dis-
cussed in Bertino et al. [1999a]. A “credential type” is created by the security
administrator to group users based on their credentials, and hence enforcing
a common set of attribute-value pairs for a given group. This set of attributes
constitutes the “cred expr” for the given credential type. A credential type deﬁ-
nition schema (XCredTypeDef) is supplied as part of the speciﬁcation language
to facilitate the creation of new credential types.
With respect to the grammar for the XCredTypeDef sheet shown in Figure 3,
mand indicates that the attribute is mandatory whereas opt indicates that
it is optional. The credential information in XCredTypeDef sheet provides a
vocabulary to express the credentials needed by the users of any organization
in order for them to be considered for assignment to speciﬁc roles. Users and
their credentials are expressed in the form of an XML document that we refer
to as XML user sheet (XUS). The grammar for XUS is shown in Figure 4. The
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Fig. 5. X-Grammar for XRS.
Fig. 6. X-Grammar for XSoDDef sheet.
“max roles” tag indicates the maximum number of roles that a user can be
assigned to. As shall be elaborated in the next section, user credentials may be
updated dynamically to capture the activity proﬁle of the user.
5.1.2 Roles. Roles are also created by the security administrator. A role
has an associated set of credentials that must be satisﬁed by the users who are
assigned to that role. Roles and their associated information is expressed in
the form of an XML document that we refer to as XML role sheet (XRS). The
grammar for XRS is shown in Figure 5.
The “role name” is a unique role identiﬁer. The cardinality of a role is the
maximum number of users assigned to it at any time. If none is explicitly sup-
plied, it is assumed unlimited.
5.1.2.1 Separation of Duty Constraints. Each role deﬁnition contains op-
tional “SSD Role Set id” and “DSD Role Set id” tags which refer to the set of
roles that are collectively in static and dynamic separation of duty, respectively,
as per the NIST RBAC standard. Each of SSD Role Set and DSD Role Set has
acardinalityattribute thatgivesthemaximum numberofrolesthat ausermay
be assigned to or can simultaneously have active in his/her sessions from the
set. The SSD Role Sets and DSD Role Sets are supplied in a separate XSoDDef
sheet. The grammar for XSoDDef sheet is shown in Figure 6.
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Fig. 7. X-Grammar for XRS constraints.
5.1.2.2 Role Hierarchies. The optional “junior” and “senior” tags referring
to junior and senior roles are used to capture hierarchical relationships in the
RBAC model. The exact semantics that should be enforced on roles within a
hierarchy are determined by the target enterprise. However, the notion of “au-
thorized roles” and “authorized permissions” as stated in the NIST RBAC stan-
dard is supported by our framework. “Authorized roles” refers to the set of
assignable roles for a user, including the roles that are directly assignable to
the user based on his/her own credentials, as well as the “junior” roles of all
such roles. “Authorized permissions” is the set of corresponding permissions for
the authorized roles.
5.1.2.3 Temporal and Nontemporal Context-Based Constraints. We now
discuss the tags of a role that capture the semantics of both temporal and
nontemporal constraint speciﬁcation and related information. All these tags
are optional since their omission simply implies the absence of constraints in
any given speciﬁcation. This set of constraints is supplied in a separate XTem-
pConstDef sheet. The grammar for XRS constraints speciﬁcation is shown in
Figure 7. The grammar for corresponding XTempConstDef sheet is shown in
Figure 8.
The “Attributes” tag of the role contains a list of role attributes that may be
parametersofthecontextconditionswhichneedtobedynamicallyevaluatedfor
any role enabling/disabling or activation/deactivation. The context conditions
may be based on temporal (such as time) or nontemporal (such as system load)
parameters,oronGTRBACstatusexpressionssuchas“whetherroleRhasbeen
enabled by user U.” The temporal parameters are captured through GTRBAC
temporal constraint expressions, whereas nontemporal context is captured us-
ing attribute-based X-Grammar constraint speciﬁcation. The “(En|Dis)abling
Constraint” and “[De]Activation Constraint” tags contain a set of conditions,
where each condition is composed of possibly multiple logical expressions for
speciﬁcation of the respective constraints. The constraint tag has an optional
op-code attribute that determines the evaluation logic of the expressions within
the constraint. An op-code of (i) “AND” implies that all constituent expressions
must be true for the constraint to be true, (ii) “OR” implies that at least one
expression must be true for the constraint to be true, and (iii) “NOT” implies
that none of the expressions must be true for the constraint to be true. The
op-code defaults to “AND” if none is speciﬁed.
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Fig. 8. X-Grammar for XTempConstDef sheet.
Each condition tag may contain a “pt expr id” or “d expr id” attribute that
refers to a periodic-time or a duration expression, respectively. These expres-
sions are the XML representation of the periodic-time expression framework
provided in the GTRBAC model, and bind the corresponding condition with
the respective periodic-time expression. We give an XML representation for
each of the start-time, interval, and duration expressions that together con-
stitute the periodic-time expression. Following the notion of “calendars” used
in the GTRBAC model, the start time expression consists of “calendar sets,”
where each calendar is a unit of time, for example, years, months, weeks, and
so on. As an example, an event that occurs at the start of the second week of
every ﬁrst and eighth month of every odd year would be represented by us-
ing “{odd}”a sthe Year set, “{1, 8}”a sthe Month Set, and “{2}”a sthe Week
Set. The optional “pt id ref” attribute indicates start time with reference to
the provided periodic-time expression id. If it is supplied, then the start time
is the same as that of the referenced periodic time. Note that a “pt id ref” is
provided only when the calendar sets are not provided, and vice versa. Any new
start time is always explicitly deﬁned using new calendar sets. An interval is
given by a (begin date, end date) pair, and a duration is speciﬁed as (calendar,
calendar length) pair. The semantics of the periodic time expression thus dic-
tate that the associated event can only occur if the start time expression is
satisﬁed by the time of request, and such time falls within the interval speci-
ﬁed by the interval expression. The duration of the event, if it occurs, would be
governed by the duration expression.
The “Logical Expression” tag contains a set of predicates, where each pred-
icate may contain a context-condition expressed in terms of role attributes,
or embed within itself another logical expression. Hence, the structure allows
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Fig. 9. X-Grammar for logical expression.
evaluation of nested conditions expressed by multiple logical expressions. The
predicatesarecomposedofcontextualparameters,wherethe“ParamName”tag
contains the name of the parameter to be evaluated, “FuncName” tag contains
the name of the function used to evaluate the parameter, and the “RetValue”
tag contains the expected return value that is to be checked according to the
given “Operator.” For instance, any attribute supplied as part of user credential
expression may be compared for a prerequisite value needed for certain role as-
signment or activation by supplying the attribute name as “ParamName,” the
required values as “RetValue,” and the comparison operator as “Operator.” The
simplest “FuncName” (as in this case) is the “isEqual()” (or equivalent) func-
tion. In more complex cases, an appropriate “FuncName” is used to evaluate
the supplied parameter(s) through a system review function, such as the status
expressions of GTRBAC model. Multiple parameter names may be passed to
functions that evaluate multiple parameters, with the distinction among pa-
rameter types made with the “type” attribute. As an example of a complex
predicate, we might evaluate status expressions for a role by supplying a status
condition such as “active r for u”a s“FuncName,” the role name and the user
id as two instances of “ParamName,” and the value of either “True” or “False”
as the “RetValue.” In such situations where a Boolean output is returned, only
“eq” operator is useful for comparison. The “Logical Expression” tag also has
an optional op-code attribute that determines the evaluation logic of the predi-
cates. On the similar lines as the constraint tag, an op-code of (i) “AND” implies
that all constituent predicates must be true for the logical expression to be true,
(ii) “OR” implies that at least one predicate must be true for the logical expres-
sion to be true, and (iii) “NOT” implies that none of the predicates must be true
for the logical expression to be true. The op-code defaults to “AND” if none is
speciﬁed.ThegrammarforlogicalexpressionspeciﬁcationisshowninFigure9.
5.1.2.4 Triggers. The grammar for constraint speciﬁcation is also used to
capture the trigger mechanism of GTRBAC model. Since an X-Grammar con-
straint syntax can include both temporal and nontemporal contextual param-
eters, it allows for speciﬁcation of context-based triggers in our X-GTRBAC
framework. This set of triggers is supplied in a separate XTrigDef sheet. The
grammar for XTrigDef sheet is shown in Figure 10.
The“Head”tagofthetriggerhasanattributethatindicatesthetargetroleor
the permission on which the trigger action is performed. An optional “user id”
attribute is also supplied for triggers that need to perform the action with
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Fig. 10. X-Grammar for XTrigDef sheet.
Fig. 11. X-Grammar for XPS.
respect to certain individual users. The triggering constraint in “Body” tag is
semantically similar to the constraints discussed above, and is evaluated in an
analogous manner. The action associated with the trigger is performed if the
constraint evaluates to true.
5.1.3 Permissions. Thepermissionsforagivensystemaredeﬁnedinterms
of “objects” and associated “operations.” The “operations” component of the
permission is typically system dependent, such as read, write, delete, create,
operate, and so on. The security administrator creates the permissions that
associatetheobjectsinthesystemwithcorrespondingoperations.Thesetofper-
missionsforasystemisexpressedintheformofanXMLdocumentthatwerefer
toasXMLPermissionSheet(XPS).ThegrammarforXPSisshowninFigure11.
The “perm id” is a unique permission identiﬁer. An object in our framework
can represent any system resource, such as documents, or inventory products,
to which permission is being assigned. Each object is represented by a unique
id and an associated type attribute. The access control requirements for various
objecttypesinanenterprisearethereforehandleduniformlybyourX-GTRBAC
framework. The extent of the access is deﬁned by the associated operation, in-
dicated by an access opcode which is one of an enumerated set of values in the
system. The “Attributes” tag of the object contains a list of resource attributes
that may be used to compose content-based conditions for permission-to-role
assignment. The resources in the system are modeled as XML, and the natural
hierarchical structure of XML DOM is used to capture the physical object hier-
archy. An object hierarchy could be composed of either documents, or document
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Table II. The XML Sheets Comprising the XML Policy Base
Primary Policy Sheets Policy Deﬁnition Sheets
XUS XCredTypeDef
XRS XSoDDef
XPS XTempConstDef
XURAS XTrigDef
XPRAS —
elements (in case of XML documents), or a series of inventory products orga-
nized according to their order of assembly, or any other organization of system
resources. A permission can, hence, have an optional propagation option, given
by the “prop” attribute, which indicates whether or not it propagates down
the object hierarchy. We allow the propagation options “no prop”, “ﬁrst level,”
and “cascade” [Bertino et al. 2001]. If no propagation option is explicitly sup-
plied, it is assumed to be “no prop,” that is, no propagation. However, the se-
curity administrator can specify a different propagation option at the time of
permission-to-role assignment if a role demands sufﬁcient privileges.
5.2 Policy Administration
The information about users, roles and permissions, and the related creden-
tials, separation of duty constraints, temporal constraints, and triggers, avail-
able from the corresponding XML documents are used in the process of policy
administration. The security administrator uses these XML sheets to specify
the policy base for the protected enterprise resources. The documents gener-
ated in this phase include an XML user-to-role assignment sheet (XURAS) and
an XML permission-to-role assignment sheet (XPRAS). These assignments are
speciﬁed through XML schemas. Keeping the user, role, and permission spec-
iﬁcations separate from their assignments allows independent design and ad-
ministration of the policy, and hence supports a modular implementation of the
X-GTRBAC system.
The policy sheets in the policy base are summarized in Table II. The infor-
mation from the policy base is used to enforce the authorization constraints.
More speciﬁcally, the users are allowed access to resources based on their as-
signed roles per the XURAS and the associated permissions per the XPRAS.
The grammar for the speciﬁcation language for the generation of these assign-
ment documents is presented below. The corresponding schemas are provided
in Appendix B in Bhatti [2003].
5.2.1 User to Role Assignment. The grammar for XURAS is shown in
Figure 12. Each “UserRoleAssignment” (URA) tag has an associated
“role name” attribute, and contains a set of “AssignUsers” tags containing the
set of users who are to be considered for potential assignment to the speciﬁed
role. Each such user is identiﬁed by the “user id” attribute of the corresponding
“AssignUser” tag. This tag also contains the assignment constraint for this par-
ticular user. The assignment constraint has a “cred type” attribute that speci-
ﬁesthecredentialtypethattheusermustpossessinordertobeconsideredfora
potential role assignment. The remaining part of the constraint is semantically
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Fig. 12. X-Grammar for XURAS.
Fig. 13. X-Grammar for XPRAS.
similar to the constraints discussed above, and is evaluated in an analogous
manner. The user is assigned to the speciﬁed role if the constraint evaluates
to true. Similar logic applies to deassignment of users from roles. Note that a
special user with user id = “any” is recognized by the system as an unknown
user, who may be required to supply additional assignment conditions in order
to be assigned to a particular role. If no explicit conditions are speciﬁed, then
any user could be assigned the particular role, which usually is the “guest” role
in most enterprise applications.
5.2.2 Permission to Role Assignment. The grammar for XPRAS is shown
in Figure 13. Each “PermissionRoleAssignment” (PRA) tag has an associated
“role name” attribute and contains a set of “AssignPermission” tags containing
the set of permissions that are to be potentially assigned to the speciﬁed role.
Each such permission is identiﬁed by a “PermId” tag within the corresponding
“AssignPermission” tag. Note that the permissions would also be subject to
temporal constraints, and hence we allow the option of speciﬁcation of periodic-
time expression for the permission assignment. The permission is assigned to
the speciﬁed role if the constraint evaluates to true. Similar logic applies to
de-assignment of permissions from roles.
6. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the system architecture of X-GTRBAC. We ﬁrst pro-
vide an overview of the system components and technologies, and then discuss
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Fig. 14. X-GTRBAC system architecture.
the implementationdetails to illustrate the process of speciﬁcation and enforce-
ment of an enterprise’s access control policy.
6.1 Overview
TheX-GTRBACframeworkallowstheXML-basedenterprisepoliciestobespec-
iﬁed and enforced through a Java-based GUI-enabled application. The applica-
tion code is readily integrated into a Web browser by an application-to-applet
transformation mechanism provided by Java.
The overall system design is depicted in Figure 14. As indicated in the ﬁg-
ure, the two main subsystems of X-GTRBAC module are the XML processor
and the GTRBAC processor. The XML processor is implemented in Java using
Java API for XML processing (JAXP). Custom modules have been designed to
get the DOM instance of parsed XML documents and forward them on to the
GTRBAC processor. The GTRBAC module then administers and enforces the
policy according to the supplied policy information. The policy information is
contained in the XML policy base. A document composition module external
to X-GTRBAC is provided to compose the policy documents. This module com-
poses the policy sheets listed in Table II. The policy sheets from the XML policy
base are then loaded into the X-GTRBAC module by the security administrator.
Since X-GTRBAC can act as both stand-alone and web-deployable application,
it may be invoked from either the local system, or remotely through an XML-
aware browser. Hence, the X-GTRBAC module seamlessly interfaces with an
external client across distributed domains over an interconnect network (i.e.,
LAN, WAN, and so on). The client may submit an access request through any
standard XML-based Web services messaging protocol, like SOAP [W3SOAP].
Similarly, the access authorization is returned via the same protocol.
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6.2 XML Processor
The XML processor contains the XML parser and the DOM tree representa-
tions of the supplied XML documents. The X-GTRBAC system provides a policy
loader to load the policy sheets for a given policy. As a next step, functionality
is provided via a policy validation module to validate the policy sheets in terms
of existence checking and type conformance. This means that all users, roles,
and permissions referenced in XURAS, XPRAS, and XTrigDef sheet must exist
in the corresponding XUS, XRS, and XPS, respectively. Also, all the referenced
data must exist in the corresponding deﬁnition ﬁles. This means that (i) the
credential types associated with the users in XUS must conform to the type
deﬁnitions in the XCredTypeDef sheet, (ii) the separation of duty constraint
sets referenced in the XRS must be present in XSoDDef sheet, and (iii) the
periodic-time, start-time, interval, and duration expressions referenced in XRS
must be present in XTempConstDef sheet. This validation support is provided
by Apache Xalan XSLT engine built into JAXP. Once the policy sheets are vali-
dated, the corresponding DOM tree representation is generated and passed on
to the GTRBAC processor. A facility is provided to display the instance of the
DOM tree via the X-GTRBAC GUI.
6.3 GTRBAC Processor
The GTRBAC processor contains the GTRBAC module and associated data
items generated by the GTRBAC module. It performs the policy administration
and enforcement tasks.
6.3.1 Policy Administration. The GTRBAC module provides functionality
to parse the DOM tree structures supplied by the XML processor and retrieves
the relevant information into its internal data structures. The policy assign-
ments are checked against the RBAC consistency rules, similar to those out-
lined in Gavrila and Barkley [1998], against violations of any SSD, DSD, or
cardinality constraints. A consistent assignment means, for instance, that a
user in question will be assigned by the GTRBAC module to the corresponding
role because it satisﬁes all the required credential and consistency conditions.
The permissions in the system are also assigned to roles under similar consis-
tency notions. It may be noted that for all the users who have been assigned to
roles, the actual role activation would occur when the user actually logs into
the system and requests a role. The notion of role assignment in this context is
of static type, that is, it implies that the user has been declared as assignable to
the said role based on already supplied credential information. There can also
be a dynamic role assignment for an unknown user based on his/her creden-
tials supplied at the time of login. These static and dynamic policy assignments,
together with the role activation and enabling rules and triggers information,
create the complete internal representation of the XML policy base within the
GTRBAC processor for enforcement of the policy. A collection of these policy
information items are referred to as UserRole (UR) datasets, PermissionRole
(PR) datasets, and TRIG dataset. A facility is provided to display the UR, PR,
and TRIG datasets via the X-GTRBAC GUI.
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Fig. 15. X-Grammar for (a) XAS (b) XSS.
6.3.2 Policy Enforcement. The information from the internal data struc-
tures is then used by the GTRBAC module to enforce the policy and manage
user sessions. The initial login into the system will create a default session
for the user with a pre-speciﬁed “minimal” set of roles activated based on the
supplied user credentials. The initial login can be the “user id” from the XUS,
if it is a known user, or a “user id” of “any,” as discussed above. In addition to
the default set of activated roles, more roles can also be activated if the user
credentialssoallow.Anytriggersassociatedwithroleactivationorotherevents
are handled by the GTRBAC module based on the information from the TRIG
dataset. Access to resources is requested in the form of an XML access request
(XAR) that speciﬁes the “object type” and “object id” of the requested resource.
An XAR could be submitted locally or remotely as an assertion in SOAP or
similar XML-based messaging protocol. This access request is then evaluated
based on the currently activated roles for this user. Only those resources may
be accessed during a session for which the activated set of roles has associated
permissions. Both the login information and XARs for a user are stored in an
XML access sheet (XAS). The session-related information is contained in the
sessions dataset within the GTRBAC processor. This information is extracted
from an activity log maintained for every user by the GTRBAC module which
we refer to as an XML sessions sheet (XSS). A session parameter is included
in the XSS to record the domain from which the user is requesting access. In
addition to the domain of the requesting user, the XSS also contains the at-
tributes such as “login time,” “login date,” and “duration” of the session. These
attributes are used to capture the activity proﬁle of the user. Such information
is constantly updated into the Sessions DataSet, where it can be dynamically
processed, and incorporated into the access decisions. This feature is useful in
certain situations where context information may be an important decision pa-
rameter, as discussed in Section 3.2. The grammar for a typical XAS and XSS
is shown in Figure 15.
7. X-GTRBAC AND THE CIE
We now present a CIE application that is currently being implemented on our
system, and discuss how the CIE speciﬁcations can be systematically mapped
to our X-GTRBAC framework to highlight the latter’s signiﬁcance.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, May 2005.X-GTRBAC • 211
Fig. 16. The functional role hierarchy and accessed system resources at each level.
7.1 CIE Policy Speciﬁcation
The access control policy for the CIE is essentially composed of the domain level
policies described for each domain within the enterprise. These domain level
policies capture the speciﬁcations of roles, users, permissions, and the related
assignments for their respective domains. In essence, each such policy captures
a minimal set of speciﬁcations that should include the following:
Functional Roles and Hierarchies. We let the roles in the CIE be repre-
sented by a functional role hierarchy that assigns, at each level of the system,
a role that is needed to carry out the associated function. This role hierarchy
captures the semantics of the top-down requirements interfacing2 and bottom-
up requests interfacing3 within the enterprise [IIES]. In addition, it associates
with the role at each level a set of responsibilities, and corresponding permis-
sions to carry out those responsibilities. These responsibilities and permissions
are captured in the domain level policies that are supplied according to the spe-
ciﬁc needs and requirements of the enterprise. The functional role hierarchy
for the CIE in our application is shown in Figure 16. The corresponding policy
name for each domain is placed in an oval above each column. The overall policy
of the enterprise may then be composed of the combination of all domain level
policies. Along the edges are placed the names of possible resources that are ac-
cessedbytherespectiverolesateachsubsequentlevel.Onlyasubsetofrelevant
2Interfacing requirements of management and staff to factory ﬂoor.
3Interfacing requests to management and staff from factory ﬂoor.
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Fig. 17. The DAG representing the execution time-frame for a project within the CIE.
functional modules has been shown in the hierarchy to illustrate the applicabil-
ityofX-GTRBACpolicyspeciﬁcationframework.Thehierarchycanaccordingly
be extended and new policies deﬁned as per the need of a speciﬁc enterprise.
Role Enabling and Activation Constraints. The functional role hierarchy
imposes a partial ordering on the timing, order, and extent of accesses by the
various roles. This constitutes the temporal semantics of access control within
the CIE, and could be captured by a directed acyclic graph (DAG), such as the
one shown in Figure 17. This particular graph represents the execution time
frameofacertainprojectscenariofortheCIEbeingimplementedinoursystem.
Theprojectrequiresthepoolingofhuman,technical,commercial,andengineer-
ing resources from various domains within the CIE. The timing between two
events is captured on the connecting arrows. Where it is not explicitly stated,
the default duration is 1 week. Note that the total time to ﬁnished product
according to the DAG is then 7 weeks. Based on the duration of the individual
tasks in the project, the corresponding roles in the CIE need to be enabled and
disabled. The enabled roles would have further constraints on activation in sit-
uations where there exist other activation constraints. The permissions for the
enabled and assigned roles would also be constrained according to the involve-
ment of the role in the current stage of the project. The temporal constraint
speciﬁcation mechanism provided by X-GTRBAC would be used to transform
the temporal constraints speciﬁed by the DAG into XML policies for the CIE.
In the light of the preceding discussion on functional roles and tasks, we list
in Table III a subset of constraints that is implemented in the CIE represented
by the role hierarchy and DAG of Figures 16 and 17, respectively.
User Credentials. An enterprise would ordinarily supply the set of users
whowouldtypicallyassumeoneofthefunctionalroleswithintheCIE,andtheir
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Table III. A Subset of Constraints Derived from the Role Hierarchy of Figure 16 and DAG of
Figure 17 for the CIE
Constraint
# Type Role Constraint Description
1. Enabling Design Manager Is enabled only starting 1st week of every
quarter of year 2003
2. Activation Design Manager May be activated only by one user at a time
3. Enabling Engg Manager Is enabled only:
(i) starting 3rd week of every quarter of year
2003, and
(ii) if Design Manager role is enabled
4. Activation Engg Manager May be activated only if Design Manager
role is activated
5. Enabling Product Designer Is enabled only:
(i) starting 3rd week of every quarter of year
2003, and
(ii) if Design Manager role is enabled
6. Activation Product Designer May be activated only if Design Manager
role is activated
7. Enabling Product Engineer Is enabled only:
(i) starting 5th week of every quarter of year
2003, and
(ii) if Product Designer AND Engg Manager
role is enabled
8. Activation Product Engineer May be activated only if Product Designer
AND Engg Manager role is activated
9. Enabling Purchase Manager/
Marketing Manager
Is enabled only:
(i) starting 5th week of every quarter of year
2003, and
(ii) if Product Designer role is enabled
10. Activation Purchase Manager/
Marketing Manager
May be activated only if Product Designer
role is activated
11. Static
Separation of
Duty (SSoD)
Purchase Manager
and Marketing
Manager
Both these roles may not be assigned to the
same user at any given time
12. Dynamic
Separation of
Duty (DSoD)
Product Designer
and Product
Engineer
Both these roles may not be simultaneously
active in the same session by the same user
13. Trigger All roles All active roles are deactivated at the start of
8th week of every quarter of year 2003
associated set of credentials that may be used in determining their assignment
to particular roles. Without loss of generality, we list in Table IV a subset of
the users we consider in our example, along with their associated credentials.
We assume for simplicity the convention that the credential types are named
so as to reﬂect the current level of responsibility, or role, held by the user. In
general, they may be named differently from the actual role name of the user.
It should also be noted that the credential expression for a user with more than
one different credential types (such as george in Table IV) is the union of the
credential expressions of each of those credential types.
Role Assignment. The roles are assigned to users consistent with their
supplied credentials. Such assignments may be constrained by temporal or
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Table IV. A Subset of Users and Associated Credentials for the CIE
# User Id Credential Type Credential Expression
1. john Product Designer age=39, level=B, qualiﬁcation=MS
2. nancy Product Engineer age=36, experience=15, qualiﬁcation=MS
3. george Assembly Designer
Product Supervisor
age=29, level=D, experience=5, qualiﬁcation=BS
4. carla Product Supervisor age=28, experience=5, qualiﬁcation=BS
5. smith Procurement Officer age=32, level=B, region=northeast
5. dorothy Procurement Officer
Marketing Supervisor
age=34, level=C, experience=20, region=midwest
Table V. A Subset of Role Assignments in the CIE
# Role User Id Credential Type Assignment Condition
1. Design Manager john Product Designer age>35 or level=A, qualiﬁcation=PhD
2. Engg Manager nancy Product Engineer age>35 or experience>10,
qualiﬁcation=MS
3. Product Designer george Assembly Designer age>20 or level=B, qualiﬁcation=BS
4 Product Engineer george
carla
Product
Supervisor
age>20 or experience=5, qualiﬁcation=BS
5. Purchase Manager smith
dorothy
Procurement
Officer
age>30 or level=B, region=midwest
6. Marketing
Manager
dorothy Marketing
Supervisor
age>30 or experience>10, region=midwest
Table VI. A Subset of Available Permissions in the CIE
Allowed
# Permission ID Object ID Object Type Operation
1. P1 Design Model Document All
2. P2 Design Model Document Read
3. P3 Engg Model Document All
4. P4 Engg Model Document Read
5. P5 Product Design Document All
6. P6 Product Design Document Read
7. P7 Engg Resources Material Equipment Operate
8. P8 Vendor Contracts Document All
9. P9 Marketing Contracts Document All
nontemporal context conditions. Once again, without loss of generality, a sub-
set of the role assignments considered in our example is listed in Table V.
Permissions. The available permissions within the CIE represent the set
of operations that may be performed on the available enterprise resources by
eligible roles. The speciﬁcation of these permissions is system dependent. We
list in Table VI a subset of the permissions assumed to be typically available in
our example.
Permission Assignment. The permission assignment determines the extent
of access of various roles within the CIE. The roles are assigned permissions
consistent with their responsibilities within the CIE. Such assignments may
be constrained by temporal or nontemporal context conditions. A typical set
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Table VII. A Subset of Permissions Assignments in the CIE
Permission
# Role ID Assignment Condition
1. Design
Manager
P1 Is assigned starting 1st week of every quarter of year 2003
for 6 weeks
2. Engg
Manager
P2 Is assigned starting 3rd week of every quarter of year 2003
for 2 weeks
P3 Is assigned starting 3rd week of every quarter of year 2003
for 4 weeks
3. Product
Designer
P2 Is assigned starting 3rd week of every quarter of year 2003
for 4 weeks
P5 Is assigned starting 3rd week of every quarter of year 2003
for 4 weeks
4. Product
Engineer
P4 Is assigned starting 5th week of every quarter of year 2003
for 2 weeks
P6 Is assigned starting 5th week of every quarter of year 2003
for 1 week
P7 Is assigned starting 5th week of every quarter of year 2003
for 2 weeks
5. Purchase
Manager
P2 Is assigned starting 5th week of every quarter of year 2003
for 1 week
P8 Is assigned starting 5th week of every quarter of year 2003
for 2 weeks
6. Marketing
Manager
P2 Is assigned starting 5th week of every quarter of year 2003
for 1 week
P9 Is assigned starting 5th week of every quarter of year 2003
for 2 weeks
of permission assignments for the CIE considered in our example is listed in
Table VII.
We capture the mapping of enterprise speciﬁcations to X-GTRBAC frame-
work in Table VIII. The table lists the functions and tasks within the CIE
and the corresponding component that is responsible for it in the X-GTRBAC
system. We next outline the process of representing this CIE policy in our
X-GTRBAC framework.
7.2 A CIE X-GTRBAC Policy
ThespeciﬁcationlanguagediscussedinSection5canbeusedtocomposethepol-
icysheetsfortheCIEbasedonthemappinggiveninTableVIII.Thepolicyspec-
iﬁcationisthenloadedintoourimplementedsystemforenforcement.Presented
below is a discussion of the composition and implementation of the policy in our
X-GTRBAC framework.
7.2.1 Policy Deﬁnition Sheets. In order to supply the necessary informa-
tion needed to enforce an access control policy, the security administrator of the
CIE loads the basic policy deﬁnitions related to credential types, separation of
duty constraints, temporal constraints, and trigger speciﬁcation. The policy
deﬁnition sheets containing this information are shown in Figures 18–21.
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Table VIII. The Mapping of CIE Speciﬁcations to X-GTRBAC Framework
Responsible Related X-GTRBAC
CIE Function/Task X-GTRBAC Module Data Element
Specify Users and Credentials Policy Loader XUS, XCredTypeDef
Specify Functional Roles and
Hierarchy
Policy Loader XRS, XSoDDef
Specify Available Permissions Policy Loader XPS
Specify Task Scheduling and Timing
(DAG)
Policy Loader XTempConstDef
Specify Task Dependencies Policy Loader XTrigDef
Specify User Eligibility for
Functional Roles
Policy Loader XURAS
Specify Permission Criteria for
Functional Roles
Policy Loader XPRAS
Validate the Enterprise Policy Policy Validation
Module
Entire XML Policy Base
Generate Enterprise Policy
Documents
XML Processor Internal DOM Tree Structure
Create User-to-role /
Permission-to-role Mapping
GTRBAC Module UR and PR DataSets
Create and Maintain User Sessions GTRBAC Module XSS, Sessions DataSets
Request Access to Enterprise
Resource
External GUI (Local
or Remote)
XAR
Enforce Access Control Policy GTRBAC Processor UR, PR, Sessions DataSets
Fig. 18. Part of the XCredTypeSheet to deﬁne the user credentials speciﬁed in Table IV.
7.2.2 Primary Policy Sheets. The security administrator next creates the
primary policy sheets related to the users, roles, permissions, user to role
assignments, and permission to role assignments. These sheets refer to the
supplemental information provided by the policy deﬁnition sheets to specify an
elaborate set of temporal and nontemporal context-based constraints for the
enterprise access control policy. As discussed in Section 6, the information from
both these sets of sheets is read into the X-GTRBAC module to constitute a
complete representation of the XML policy base for policy enforcement. The
primary policy sheets for the CIE are shown in Figures 22–26.
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Fig. 19. The XSoDDef sheet to deﬁne the separation of duty constraints speciﬁed in Table III.
Fig. 20. Part of the XTempDefSheet to deﬁne the constraints speciﬁed in Table III.
In particular, note that (i) the credential expression shown in XUS of
Figure 22 captures the credential expression #1 in Table IV for user john, and
(ii) the activation and enabling onstraints on Design Manager role in the XRS
shown in Figure 23 capture the constraints #1 and #2 of Table III. Similarly, the
reference to the dynamic separation of duty role set in Product Designer role
captures the constraint #12 of Table III. Also note that (i) the role assignment
shown in XURAS of Figure 25 captures the assignment condition #1 in Table V
foruserjohn,and(ii)thepermissionassignmentsshowninXPRASofFigure26
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, May 2005.218 • R. Bhatti et al.
Fig. 21. The XTrigDef sheet to deﬁne the trigger speciﬁed in Table III.
Fig. 22. Part of the XUS to deﬁne the users speciﬁed in Table IV.
capture the assignment conditions #1 and #4 in Table VII for Design Manager
and Product Engineer roles, respectively.
7.3 Implementation Experiences
This section discusses our implementation experiences with the CIE example
on our working prototype system.
The policy sheets are loaded into the X-GTRBAC system through the policy
loader module. The XML processor loads the policy sheets as DOM, and the
GTRBAC module stores the policy information from the DOM into internal
system data structures. Based on this information, some of the policy assign-
ments effected by the GTRBAC processor are shown in Figure 27. In particular,
we note the following:
(i) john has not been assigned the Product Designer role since he does not
have the required qualiﬁcation (PhD).
(ii) nancy has been assigned the Engg Manager role.
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Fig. 23. Part of the XRS to deﬁne the roles illustrated in the role hierarchy of Figure 16, and
capture the constraints on them speciﬁed in Table III.
Fig. 24. Part of the XPS to deﬁne the permissions speciﬁed in Table VI.
(iii) dorothy is assignable to both Purchase Manager and Marketing Manager
roles. However, she can be assigned only to one of them (a policy val-
idation rule) because of the static separation of duty constraint #11 in
Table III.
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Fig. 25. Part of the XURAS to deﬁne the role assignments speciﬁed in Table V.
(iv) georgehasbeenassignedtobothProduct DesignerandProduct Engineer
roles, however, he may only have one of them activated at any given time
due to the dynamic separation of duty constraint #12 in Table III. This
follows from the notion of role assignment and activation as treated in our
framework.
(v) smith cannot assume the role of Purchase Manager since his region is not
midwest.
(vi) nancy has been authorized the permission P7 by virtue of being senior to
the Product Engineer role.
Note that the permissions of the roles within the CIE are constrained ac-
cording to the policy speciﬁcation by including the duration expression within
the permission assignment constraints. The fact that all roles need to be dis-
abled after the speciﬁed project duration expires will be handled by the disable
action trigger that would ﬁre at the start of the 8th week to disable all roles.
In case a role is activated up to the end of speciﬁed duration, the semantics
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Fig. 26. Part of the XPRAS to deﬁne the permission assignments speciﬁed in Table VII.
of GTRBAC model require that the trigger ﬁrst deactivates the role, and then
disables it. It may be mentioned that a role may also have explicit duration
constraints if it so requires. Also indicated in the ﬁgures are the authorized
roles and permissions that are acquired by virtue of the role hierarchy.
The policy administration process thus creates a complete internal repre-
sentation of the speciﬁed enterprise policy. The policy enforcement phase then
uses this information to allow the users to create sessions and access permitted
resources. The various context conditions supplied within the activation con-
straints are then evaluated to make access control decisions, as discussed in
Section 6. We invoke individual sessions for the users, and apply a three-level
security mechanism to effectively enforce the access control policy: (i) the user
may only activate a role if he/she already meets the assignment criteria for it,
and this restriction is imposed through the X-GTRBAC GUI by allowing only
the assigned roles to appear in a drop down list of roles to choose from; (ii) the
role activation goes through only if the role is enabled at that particular in-
stance; (iii) when in an activated role, the user is restricted to request access to
only those resources that the activated roles for the user have permission on,
and this restriction is also imposed by allowing a selection from a drop down
list of available accessible resources corresponding to the assigned permissions
of the activated role. Hence, the three stage security mechanism ensures the
enforcement of access control policy by restricting user access to only his/her
available set of resources, and preventing any possibility for even requesting
access to any unauthorized resource.
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Fig. 27. Snapshots of policy display, clockwise from top left: (i) User credentials for george, (ii)
information for product designer role, (iii) user to role assignment for nancy, and (iv) permission to
role assignment for engg manager role.
The updated documentation, XML schemas and downloadable releases of
X-GTRBAC system can be accessed at our project website at http://shay.ecn.
purdue.edu/∼iisrl/ccgtrbac.html.
8. RELATED WORK
The speciﬁcation of security policies for enterprises has recently emerged as an
active research area. The advent of the RBAC model has generally been hailed
as a promising sign in the industry and research community for its potential to
simplify authorization administration in large enterprises. Related work has
broadly spanned the aspects of both presenting system architecture and imple-
mentation of RBAC-based technologies for enterprise security administration,
and complementing the RBAC model to introduce extended policy speciﬁcation
frameworks.Inthefollowing,wesummarizetheeffortsinboththesedirections,
and then highlight the signiﬁcance of our particular work.
Several approaches have been presented in the literature to address various
aspects of security administration within an enterprise. Applications of RBAC
policies to workﬂow systems [Bertino et al. 1999b] and Web services [Bhatti
et al. 2004b] have been proposed. An XML-based approach to specify enterprise
RBAC policies has been reported in Vuong et al. [2001]. Ferraiolo et al. [1999]
use the RBAC model to address access control needs of enterprise computing
environments. They have attempted to present an RBAC-based approach as
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an alternative to ACL-based access control scheme used within a corporate in-
tranet, and have illustrated its use through a reference implementation. Kern
[2002] presents an ERBAC model for enterprise-wide role-based access control.
Their model uses the notion of enterprise roles with parameterization and is
reported by the authors as being helpful in reducing the administration ef-
fort required to maintain users and their access rights in large enterprises.
They have augmented their work with the discussion of a commercial security
administration tool. All these schemes, however, are not suited to enterprises
with dynamic content- and context-aware access control requirements, such as
the one illustrated through the example in the paper, since they provide no
explicit mechanism to support evaluation of dynamic user credentials and con-
text conditions. The discussion on implementation in Kern [2002] talks about
interfaces to consolidate information from constituent subsystems of the enter-
prise in a common security repository using a system independent conceptual
model. This repository may be similar to our XML policy base of Section 5. How-
ever,thedesignofinterfaceswouldactuallydeterminethedegreetowhichtheir
system would actually be able to support the heterogeneity of the subsystems
within a large CIE.
TherehasbeenaneffortintheresearchcommunitytocomplementtheRBAC
model with additional features to allow extended policy speciﬁcation frame-
works. A temporal extension to RBAC has been presented in the TRBAC model
[Bertino et al. 2001]. TRBAC supports the speciﬁcation of temporal constraints
on role enabling, and the dependencies among them, and hence provides a
mechanism to enforce time-dependent access control. A generalized GTRBAC
model presented in Joshi et al. [2005] is capable of providing a wider range
of temporal constraints, including periodic as well as duration constraints on
user-to-role assignments, permission-to-role assignments, and role activation.
The GTRBAC model extends the syntactic structure of TRBAC; however, the
notion of user credentials is not supported in both these schemes to allow the
assignment of authenticated users to a particular role.
Some recent work has been reported in XML-based security and context-
aware access control. Two prominent security speciﬁcations emerging from the
industrial community are the Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML)
[XML Coverpage 2003b] and the XML Access Control Language (XACML)
[XML Coverpage 2003a]. While SAML is directed primarily as an authenti-
cation mechanism, XACML is intended for Web-based authorization. XACML
[XML Coverpage 2003a] speciﬁcation is based on an extension of XML to de-
ﬁne an access control speciﬁcation that supports notions similar to those of
user credentials and context-based privilege assignments. It, however, does
not directly support the notion of roles, and hence lacks the essential features
as separation of duty constraints, role hierarchy, and cardinality. The absence
of roles also prohibits the provision of a comprehensive mechanism to supply
and evaluate sophisticated temporal constraints on assignments of users to
privileged tasks, since direct user-to-permission assignments violate the very
principles of scalability and manageability that motivated the use of GTRBAC
(see Section 3.2). The OASIS model for active security presented in Bacon et al.
[2002] addresses the context-aware access control requirements within large
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scale systems. It is an extension of the RBAC model with parameters based on
ﬁrst order logic, and allows ﬁne-grained evaluation of dynamic user credentials
and context conditions. The parameter-based evaluation of context predicates
is similar to our notion of evaluating logical expressions with predicates and
parameters explicitly supplied via the XML policy sheets. The discussion on
environmental predicates closely resembles that of the temporal constraints
provided in our framework. The paper emphasizes on the formal logic-based
semantics of the model with its own merits, but it does not detail any imple-
mentation architecture to enforce the same. The implementation, however, is
relatedbytheauthorstoamiddlewarearchitecturethatsupportsasynchronous
events, and requires a mechanism that allows the communicating systems to
acquire support for asynchronous operations. Although this scheme is designed
to be scalable and manageable for distributed environments, the fact that it re-
lies on extending the client’s capabilities to make them able to communicate
with the OASIS server adds signiﬁcant overhead to its wide-scale deployment.
One such scenario would be to conﬁgure it to allow heterogeneous, distributed
systems to interoperate in the afore-referred generic CIE environment. Since
our framework is entirely XML based, our approach allows for adopting the
XML-based middleware architecture [W3 SOAP] that is emerging as a widely
acceptedstandardforcommunicationamongdistributedapplications,andthus
signiﬁcantly reduces the burden attached thereto. Our system hence captures
the combined semantics of both XACML and OASIS models and achieves se-
cure enterprise-wide interoperation with dynamic ﬁne-grained access control.
To the best of our knowledge, an XML-based GTRBAC approach to address
enterprise-wide access control similar to the one we have presented in this
paper has not been previously investigated.
9. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have highlighted the challenges for enterprise-wide access
control and presented X-GTRBAC framework, an XML-based speciﬁcation lan-
guage based on the GTRBAC model and its implementation, which addresses
them. Our speciﬁcation language provides compact representation of access
control policies for a generic CIE, while incorporating the security relevant fea-
tures that have been motivated in this paper to allow content-based, context-
aware access control. The language conforms to the GTRBAC model, and hence
incorporates the features from the NIST RBAC model and the temporal exten-
sionsproposedthereupon.Wehaveemphasizedseparationoflanguageschemas
to provide efﬁcient speciﬁcation of deﬁnitions of RBAC elements, user-to-role
and permission-to-role assignments, hierarchical and separation of duty con-
straints, and an elaborate set of temporal constraints. Such separation allows
for an extensible design of the enterprise access control policy. Our speciﬁcation
language additionally augments GTRBAC with attribute-based credential and
constraint speciﬁcation mechanism which allows capturing contextual infor-
mation is user-to-role and permission-to-role assignments. The language can
be used to specify GTRBAC policies for securing heterogeneous, distributed
enterprise resources, and allows dynamic evaluation of user credentials and
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context information to provide ﬁne-grained access control. An implementation
based on Java has also been presented, and the system architecture has been
illustrated to highlight its salient features. Our framework hence allows an
enterprise’s access control policy to be expressed in XML, and enforced through
the X-GTRBAC system module. A comprehensive example has been discussed
to motivate and illustrate the applicability of the model to a generic CIE. We
have provided the speciﬁcations for an enterprise access control policy, and a
mapping thereof to our framework. Our implementation experiences have also
been presented on our working prototype system.
The complexity of policy administration done in a centralized manner can
be signiﬁcantly high in a large enterprise. We have recently proposed a de-
centralized administration model for the X-GTRBAC framework [Bhatti et al.
2004c]. The decentralized model uses the notion of administrative domains to
decentralize the policy administration tasks. We plan to incorporate support for
the administrative concepts outlined in that work in our existing X-GTRBAC
prototype.
A major direction for future will be extending our X-GTRBAC framework
to distributed interenterprise environments. This poses several challenges, the
key amongst them being semantic heterogeneity management. Each individ-
ual system of a multienterprise environment can have its own access control
policy at a local level, and the integration of these local policies entails various
challenges regarding reconciliation of semantic differences between local poli-
cies,secureinteroperability,containmentofriskpropagation,globallevelpolicy
management, and so on [Joshi et al. 2001]. When local policies of individual en-
terprises are integrated to generate a global policy or metapolicy that governs
the rules for access mediation within a multienterprise environment, semantic
differences and inconsistencies among the local policies must be resolved in or-
der to ensure secure interoperation. Efﬁcient administration and management
of global level policy becomes challenging, particularly as local policies evolve
with time. We plan to explore the promise of our XML-based GTRBAC frame-
work for its support for information management and access control in dis-
tributedsystemstohandlethesemanticheterogeneitychallengesposedbysuch
environments.
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